Privacy Notice
This notice states what is true of the running system today. It will be updated, and re-versioned, if any of it changes.
Inference runs through a local model gateway on this same private server. Your journal entries are not sent to OpenRouter or any outside AI company. If the local model is unavailable, the entry waits and is retried. That AI runs on this same computer and reads your entry text in readable form while it works, and the names and text it needs go into its prompts.
Voice entries are transcribed on the same server. The temporary files used for that work are created private to the app (owner-only) and deleted when the work finishes. The audio file is unlinked immediately after transcription.
The database is encrypted as a whole with SQLCipher. In addition, each account has its own encryption key, unique to that account, and these kinds of text are encrypted with it: journal entries (as written, cleaned, and split into segments) and cleaning notes; the text the system derives from them (action titles, descriptions and snippets, task wording, suggestion text and examples, the model's reasoning for a value-level suggestion, the practice description, the suggestion rationale, the proposed practice names, and the names of people mentioned); and what you write yourself (action updates, practice and value names, notes, descriptions, keywords, value descriptions, templates, reflections, review answers, saved reviews and drafts, waypoint text, Telegram digest replies, body notes and feedback, and card-sort state). Weekly review results, pattern clusters and Shadow readings are covered too. Your monthly review notes and settings, including anything you hide or undo, are covered too.
The per-account keys are stored in the database, wrapped by a master key kept in a file on this same computer, outside the database and outside backups. A stolen database or newer backup is therefore unreadable without that master key. It does not protect against the administrator, who controls the computer. The admin database tools on this computer show these fields as encrypted values, but the administrator can still decrypt them. If the master key were lost, the encrypted text could not be recovered.
Not protected by your own key, only by the whole-database encryption: your account display name; the labels, counts and timestamps the system assigns; practice tags; and a few machine-generated or shared fields. Some of these may contain your words or names, such as bug-report details. Usage records (which screens you open, how long) are stored without text of what you wrote. A row the system cannot attribute to an account would be left unencrypted.
Readable copies also exist outside that protection: caches that normally last under a minute and can hold readable action titles, waypoint text and names; screenshots attached to bug reports, which are stored unencrypted; what you type in a bug report, with your user id, the page you were on and your recent clicks, which is sent to the team's internal task board; and backups, which are kept on drives in this computer. A backup made before a given kind of text was encrypted still holds that text readable. I will delete those older backups; until I do, they stay on drives in this computer.
Runtime logs are designed not to hold your entry or message text, and the cache is built to avoid storing entry text. Core dumps are disabled for the app's services.
Telegram is a separate boundary. If you connect it, messages you send pass through Telegram's servers, outside this app's control. Connecting is your choice and is acknowledged separately when you connect.
Companies that handle some of your data. Your entries are read by an AI model that runs on my own computer. They are not sent to an outside AI company. A few other companies handle limited data so the service can run. Stripe processes payments. It receives your email address, your payment card details and your purchase history, and a record that you confirmed you are 18 or older and accepted the Terms (with the version). Your card details go to Stripe and never to my computer, and Stripe does not receive your journal entries. Resend sends the password-reset email. It receives the address on file and the one-time link, and only members who have a recovery email address on file can receive one. Cloudflare carries public traffic to Soulitics. On that path the secure connection ends at Cloudflare, so it can see the requests you make, including what you write.
Deleting your account disables it immediately, with a 14-day recovery window before deletion becomes permanent.
The access that matters most
I can read what you write. Soulitics runs on a computer in my home. I am the only administrator. Nothing in the system prevents me from opening your journal entries. I am committing, in writing, that I will not read your entry text as part of this study — my analysis uses counts, timestamps, and the labels the system assigns, not your words — but you should decide whether to take part knowing the technical access exists.
Soulitics is not a covered entity under HIPAA, is not a clinical service, and this notice does not imply any regulatory or clinical-grade protection of your data.
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